{"id":19,"date":"2026-06-25T12:45:42","date_gmt":"2026-06-25T12:45:42","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/hoge.gg\/se\/what-is-mev-who-pays\/"},"modified":"2026-06-25T12:45:42","modified_gmt":"2026-06-25T12:45:42","slug":"what-is-mev-who-pays","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/hoge.gg\/se\/what-is-mev-who-pays\/","title":{"rendered":"Vad \u00e4r MEV, och vem betalar egentligen f\u00f6r det?"},"content":{"rendered":"\r\n

Between 15 September 2022 \u00e2\u20ac\u201d the day the Merge introduced proposer-builder separation in its current form \u00e2\u20ac\u201d and the end of Q1 2026, validators on Ethereum have collected roughly $760m in priority fees and MEV through the MEV-Boost<\/a> relay network. The figure comes from mevboost.pics<\/a>‘s rolling dashboard, cross-checked against the Flashbots transparency reports. That is the easy number. The harder one \u00e2\u20ac\u201d the one this article exists to walk through \u00e2\u20ac\u201d is who actually paid it. Because MEV is not a tax on the network. It is a transfer, mostly from one set of users to another, with three or four intermediaries taking a cut on the way through.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

Between 15 september 2022 \u2013 dagen d\u00e5 Merge introducerade proposer-builder-separation i sin nuvarande form \u2013 och slutet av Q1 2026 har validerare p\u00e5 Ethereum samlat in cirka 760 miljoner USD i prioriteringsavgifter och MEV genom MEV-Boost<\/a>-relayn\u00e4tverket. Figuren h\u00e4rr\u00f6r fr\u00e5n mevboost.pics<\/a> l\u00f6pande dashboard, som har korskontrollerats mot Flashbots transparensrapporter. Det \u00e4r det enkla antalet. Det sv\u00e5rare \u2013 det som denna artikel finns till f\u00f6r att g\u00e5 igenom \u2013 \u00e4r vem som egentligen betalade det. F\u00f6r MEV \u00e4r inte en skatt p\u00e5 n\u00e4tverket. Det \u00e4r en \u00f6verf\u00f6ring, fr\u00e4mst fr\u00e5n en anv\u00e4ndargrupp till en annan, d\u00e4r tre eller fyra mellanh\u00e4nder tar en del p\u00e5 v\u00e4gen.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

N\u00e4r du ser MEV som en \u00f6verf\u00f6ring snarare \u00e4n som friktion, g\u00f6r en stor del av den policydebatt som kringg\u00e5r det mer mening. Sandwich-attacker \u00e4r inte gratis pengar fr\u00e5n luften; det \u00e4r pengar som tas fr\u00e5n swap-anv\u00e4ndaren, routas genom s\u00f6karen, byggaren, relayn och proposer. Den r\u00e4tt fr\u00e5ga \u00e4r inte “\u00e4r MEV bra eller d\u00e5lig” men “vilken del av den pipeline \u00e4r hyra, och vilken del betalar f\u00f6r en tj\u00e4nst anv\u00e4ndaren faktiskt vill ha?” Svaret \u00e5r 2026 visar sig vara obekv\u00e4mt.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

The MEV stack, defined precisely<\/h2>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

MEV-stacken, definierad exakt<\/h2>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

“MEV” stod ursprungligen f\u00f6r miner extractable value, ett begrepp som skapades i Flash Boys 2.0-papperet<\/a> i april 2019. Efter Merge blev det omd\u00f6mt till maximal extractable value, vilket \u00e4r mer \u00e4rligt eftersom extractor inte alltid \u00e4r blockproducenten l\u00e4ngre. Den nuvarande pipeline har fyra roller, och gr\u00e4nsen mellan dem \u00e4r enormt viktig f\u00f6r vem som profitar.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

Role<\/th>What they do<\/th>Where their revenue comes from<\/th>Typical share of an MEV block<\/th><\/tr><\/thead>
Searcher<\/td>Spots an opportunity (arb, liquidation, sandwich), builds a bundle<\/td>Difference between opportunity value and bundle bid<\/td>10-40%<\/td><\/tr>
Builder<\/td>Assembles a full block from searcher bundles + public mempool<\/td>Margin between block value and proposer bid<\/td>0-5% (often razor-thin)<\/td><\/tr>
Relay<\/td>Forwards builder blocks to proposers, enforces data availability<\/td>Mostly free; some run by Flashbots, bloXroute, Eden, Ultra Sound, Aestus<\/td>0%<\/td><\/tr>
Proposer (validator)<\/td>Signs the highest-bid header from the relay<\/td>Proposer bid (priority fees + MEV tip)<\/td>55-90%<\/td><\/tr><\/tbody><\/table>
Approximate revenue split per MEV-bearing block. Source: Flashbots transparency dashboard and rated.network builder analytics, Q1 2026.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n
Roll<\/th>Vad de g\u00f6r<\/th>Hvar deras int\u00e4kter kommer fr\u00e5n<\/th>Typisk del av en MEV-block<\/th><\/tr><\/thead>
S\u00f6kare<\/td>Uppt\u00e4cker en m\u00f6jlighet (arb, liquidation, sandwich), skapar en bundle<\/td>Differensen mellan m\u00f6jlighetsv\u00e4rde och bundle-bud<\/td>10\u201340 %<\/td><\/tr>
Byggare<\/td>Monterar en full block fr\u00e5n s\u00f6kare-bundles + offentlig mempool<\/td>Marginalen mellan blockv\u00e4rde och proposer-bud<\/td>0\u20135 % (ofta knivtunn)<\/td><\/tr>
Relay<\/td>\u00d6verf\u00f6r byggare-block till proposers, s\u00e4kerst\u00e4ller dataavailability<\/td>F\u00f6r det mesta gratis; vissa drivs av Flashbots, bloXroute, Eden, Ultra Sound, Aestus<\/td>0 %<\/td><\/tr>
Proposer (validerare)<\/td>Signerar h\u00f6gst-bud-huvudet fr\u00e5n relay<\/td>Proposer-bud (prioriteringsavgifter + MEV-tip)<\/td>55\u201390 %<\/td><\/tr><\/tbody><\/table>
Approximativ int\u00e4ktsdelning per MEV-b\u00e4rande block. K\u00e4lla: Flashbots transparensdashboard och rated.network byggare-analys, Q1 2026.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

Two things stand out in that table. The first is that builders, despite being where most of the technical sophistication lives, capture almost none of the value. The market has compressed builder margins to single-digit basis points in a brutal race-to-zero that is well-documented in Flashbots’ own research blog<\/a>. The second is that the proposer \u00e2\u20ac\u201d the validator who just holds the key \u00e2\u20ac\u201d gets the lion’s share without doing any of the searching. This is the proposer-builder separation working as designed: validators stay decentralised by outsourcing the hardest part of block construction to a competitive market of specialists.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

Tv\u00e5 saker sticker ut i den tabellen. Den f\u00f6rsta \u00e4r att byggare, trots att de \u00e4r d\u00e4r den mesta tekniska sofistikerade ligger, f\u00e5ngar n\u00e4stan inget av v\u00e4rdet. Marknaden har pressat byggare-marginaler till enstaka baspunkter i en brutal race-to-zero som \u00e4r v\u00e4l dokumenterad i Flashbots eget forskningsblogg<\/a>. Den andra \u00e4r att proposer \u2013 valideraren som bara h\u00e5ller nyckeln \u2013 f\u00e5r den st\u00f6rsta delen utan att g\u00f6ra n\u00e5got av s\u00f6kandet. Det \u00e4r proposer-builder-separationen som fungerar som designad: validerare h\u00e5ller sig decentraliserade genom att outsourca den sv\u00e5raste delen av blockkonstruktion till en konkurrenskraftig marknad av specialister.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

The four kinds of MEV, with examples<\/h2>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

MEV:s fyra typer, med exempel<\/h2>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

Not all MEV is the same, and conflating it is the most common mistake in the debate. There are roughly four categories, and they have very different ethical weight.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

All MEV \u00e4r inte samma sak, och att sammanblanda det \u00e4r den vanligaste misstaget i debatten. Det finns ungef\u00e4r fyra kategorier, och de har mycket olika etisk tyngd.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n